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LIBERALISM AND NIHILISM: 
CONTEMPORARY CONSTRAINED 
PERFORMANCE THEORIES OF 
JUSTICE 
Michael P. Zuckert* 
At first glance the liberal tradition in political philosophy ap-
pears extraordinarily alive. Within living memory this was not al-
ways so, for all political philosophy, including the liberal variety, 
was declared dead in the face of a philosophic and social scientific 
critique of all "oughts" as merely "values," or ultimately "prefer-
ences." In the 1970's, however, we experienced an impressive re-
birth of liberal political philosophy, for which John Rawls usually 
receives and probably deserves credit. I wish to discuss here what 
might be called the Rawlsian liberal tradition. Although the think-
ers I would put in this tradition disagree quite strongly with Rawls 
about a number of important things, and are usually viewed as dif-
fering sharply from him in methodology as well as substance, they 
nonetheless take their inspiration from him, and agree with him and 
each other in two important respects: they all develop self-con-
sciously liberal political philosophies, and they all employ a basi-
cally similar method of generating political principles. 
I will call their method "constrained performance." A con-
strained performance theory is one in which the standards of 
justice, or more broadly of political right, emerge as the product of 
actions taken by persons within specially defined situations, charac-
terized by explicitly specified constraints. Rawls and Robert 
Nozick are the best known representatives of this tradition, but I 
shall also discuss Bruce Ackerman's Social Justice and the Liberal 
State. I I focus my discussion of these current versions of liberal 
• Dorothy H. and Edward C. Congdon Professor of Political Science, Carleton Col-
lege. An earlier version of this essay was prepared for a conference on "What is Living and 
What is Dead in the Liberal Tradition," held at Colorado College, and was printed in the 
proceedings of that conference, THE PROMISE OF LIBERALISM (T. Fuller ed. 1984). 
I. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND 
UTOPIA (1974); B. ACKERMAN, SociAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980). There are 
many others who might be included, but most of them are close enough to Rawls not to 
require separate treatment 
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philosophy on their commitment to constrained performance, to 
show what the performance is, and how it leads to the political prin-
ciples it is claimed to produce. I conclude that all the constrained 
performance theories fail and end by asking what this failure means 
for the viability of the liberal tradition of political philosophy. In 
my exposition, I have chosen what I hope is the golden middle 
course, supplying enough of the arguments for the uninitiated to 
follow, without bogging down those already familiar with the posi-
tions of Rawls and the others. 
I. JOHN RAWLS'S CONSTRAINED PERFORMANCE: 
THE FOUNDERING OF THE DEMAND OF 
JUSTICE 
The performance in Rawls's theory is a contract-like agreement 
that human beings, each seeking his or her own benefit, unani-
mously make over what principles of justice will govern their com-
mon life. Whatever principles are agreed to in the choice situation 
are the correct principles of justice. It is a constrained performance 
because only a very specially defined choice situation will produce 
the principles of justice. It should be obvious that not every choice 
position can produce a unanimous agreement. Likewise, principles 
or agreements that might emerge from many choice situations are 
often clearly not just. 
Rawls calls his choice situation the "original position." He 
attempts to define the original position in such a way that it is "the 
appropriate initial status quo."2 In the original position men stand 
behind a "veil of ignorance," which guarantees that when they de-
liberate over principles of justice they lack all knowledge of them-
selves in their particularity, so that whatever decision they make 
will be truly "fair." Thus in the original position 
no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any 
one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelli-
gence, strength, and the like .... [T]he parties do not [even) know their concep-
tions of the good or their special psychological propensities.3 
Under these constraints, Rawls believes, the participants will 
agree upon two principles of justice, together called by him "demo-
cratic equality": 
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive liberty com-
patible with a similar liberty for others. 
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
2. J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 12. 
3. /d. 
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both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.4 
391 
Since the first principle more or less restates the familiar liberal 
commitment to political and personal liberty, Rawls's theory clearly 
resides within the broad confines of the liberal tradition. The sec-
ond principle also agrees with widely accepted liberal commitments 
to equality of opportunity, but diverges from those when it holds 
that no inequalities are justifiable unless they work to make the 
worst off in society better off than they would be without the ine-
qualities, "better otr' understood here entirely without regard to 
feelings of envy or resentment. 
The novelty of Rawls's constrained performance theory be-
comes visible upon comparing it to classical liberal political philoso-
phy. By denominating his theory "contractarian" he means to 
place himself within the social contract tradition of "Locke, Rous-
seau and Kant. "s Indeed, classical social contract theory itself 
might be seen as a kind of constrained performance theory: the par-
ties, through the performance of the contract, bring into existence 
their political society, and the nature of their agreement determines 
the character and principles of their political order. For example, 
Locke discerns the limits of the legislative power from the rational 
decision his contractors would make about it when they come to-
gether to establish government.6 
It is, however, only partly accurate to consider the classical 
liberals like Locke as theorists of constrained performance. The 
performance does not for Locke, as it does for Rawls, purport to 
settle the most important matters. As the Declaration of Indepen-
dence states the Lockean position, men "are endowed by their crea-
tor with certain inalienable rights" and "governments are instituted 
among men to secure these rights." That is, the standards of jus-
tice, or more broadly of rightful government, are not generated in 
the constrained performance of the social contract, but precede the 
performance altogether, and have their source in God or nature. 
The rights provide the pregiven standards for the performance, 
guiding it to a more or less determinate conclusion as pregiven ends 
guiding deliberation over means. 7 Thus for classical liberal theory 
the performance plays a segregated and subordinate role, while in 
Rawls it dominates, settling not only the derivative or means ques-
tions, but also the fundamental or ends questions of the principles of 
4. /d. at 60, 83. 
5. /d. at II. 
6. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 373-81. 
7. J. RAWLS, supra note I, at 6. 
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political right as such.s 
Moreover, while Rawls suggests a "correspondence" between 
his doctrine of the original position and the Lockean state of nature, 
they are in fact quite different: Locke's state of nature abstracts 
away all conventions, leaving nature as the special form of con-
straint on the performance to follow, while Rawls's original position 
abstracts away nature as well. 9 The original position dramatically 
radicalizes the Lockean state of nature by stripping away all that 
characterized and motivated men in that state. The original posi-
tion is most emphatically not a state of nature; it is far closer to a 
state of antinature or nonnature. 
The features of Lockean theory that Rawls omits have been 
exceedingly controversial. The central issue probably concerns the 
natural rights, the naturally pregiven standards. Many doubt that 
Locke provides adequate grounds for believing that rights exist, and 
for saying that they consist of life, liberty, and property. The Dec-
laration of Independence finesses the issue by its reference to "self-
evident" truths, a philosophically troublesome claim indeed.w 
Rawls is not burdened by these or any other positive standards of 
right prior to the performance. The constrained performance itself, 
and nothing else, supplies the content of political right. 
Likewise, by looking to the state of nature Locke entangled 
himself in difficult semantic and factual questions. What exactly is 
a "state of nature," and what evidence is there that men once lived 
in it? Rawls's doctrine avoids this difficulty as well. His original 
position can only be thought into. While some critics (like Acker-
man) find the Rawlsian original position too abstract even to con-
ceive of, this is not a serious problem. As Rawls says, "[O]ne or 
more persons can at any time enter this position, or perhaps, better, 
simulate the deliberations of this hypothetical situation, simply by 
reasoning in accordance with the appropriate restrictions."•• To be 
in the original position is merely to respect in one's thinking the 
constraints which define that position. 
Of course, the avoidance of some of the well-known difficulties 
of Locke's theory by no means justifies Rawls's tum to a con-
strained performance theory, nor validates the particular version of 
that theory he developed. Indeed three clusters of issues need to be 
8. Similarly, for the "performance" of utilitarianism's "disinterested observer," the 
standard of pleasure-pain (or utility) is pregiven. 
9. Cf D. ScHAEFER, JUSTICE OR TYRANNY1 38-39 (1979). 
10. On "self-evidence" in the Declaration, consider the recent discussions in G. WILLS, 
INVENTING AMERICA 181-92 {1978); and M. WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 9-96 (1978). 
11. J. RAwLS, supra note 1, at 138. 
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raised about Rawls's contractarianism. First, why should we adopt 
constrained performance theory? Second, why should we adopt the 
particular constraints Rawls employs? And third, does the per-
formance generate the principles of justice that are supposed to fol-
low from it? 
Rawls's turn to constrained performance derives from the con-
junction of two more primitive insights or foundational principles 
respecting justice. The first I shall call the antiutilitarian principle ; 
the second, the demand of justice. Rawls takes utilitarianism to 
hold that "society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its 
major institutions are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net bal-
ance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to 
it."I2 While Rawls does not dwell on them, he clearly is impressed 
with all the horror stories that have been raised against utilitarian-
ism. For example, since utilitarianism looks to maximum total (or 
average) net satisfaction, it seems to raise no barrier to Roman prin-
ciples of social policy: sacrifice a few to the lions in such a way as to 
give very many much pleasure. Such a view, Rawls believes, "does 
not take seriously the distinction between persons" in its apparent 
willingness to trade off the agony of some against the pleasure of 
others.I3 In this it is proceeding contrary both to empirical fact-
human individuals are the reality, society a construct-and to 
moral fact-we have an "intuitive conviction," or a "considered 
moral judgment" of the "primacy of justice," which finds "an invio-
lability founded on justice" in each person "that even the welfare of 
society as a whole cannot override." I4 The greater good of some or 
even of the whole cannot outweigh sacrifices imposed on others. 
To this intuition of "the inviolability of each individual," 
which we are dubbing the antiutilitarian principle, Rawls adds his 
demand of justice. We can understand that demand if we look at 
Rawls's thought as an effort to think through the problem of what is 
the basis for what one is due. He begins with an essentially negative 
insight: what one deserves cannot rest on something undeserved. 
To rest the deserved on the undeserved is to make desert arbitrary. 
It follows, he believes, that justice cannot be the rewarding of unde-
served inequalities, or more broadly, of undeserved qualities. This 
general demand of justice, although not explicitly formulated by 
Rawls in this manner, seems to be the implicit criterion for his criti-
cism of the kind of equal opportunity principles of justice that class-
ical liberal theory endorsed. As he says in that critique, "no one 
12. Id. at 22. 
13. Jd. at 27. 
14. /d. at 3-4. 
394 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 2:389 
deserves his place in the distribution of native endowments," any 
more than he can claim credit for those "fortunate family and social 
circumstances" which support the "superior character" which in 
tum supports "effort."1s The demand is entirely negative or dis-
qualifying: what one is due cannot rest on any of the natural or 
social or other proscribed bases of desert. 
The conjunction of the two foundational principles produces 
Rawls's tum toward a constrained performance theory and largely 
determines the specific character of the constraints and of the per-
formance as well. If the utilitarians fail in not paying sufficient at-
tention to the individual's claims, then the remedy is to give the 
individual a voice. That was a basic insight of contract theory as 
developed by Hobbes and Locke, and Rawls reasserts the con-
tractarian approach in order to guarantee that the antiutilitarian 
principle is satisfied. The individuals, all of whom must agree to the 
principles of justice, surely will not accept any principle which 
might sacrifice them to others or to the whole. Rawls allows this 
sort of self-interested calculation, as utilitarianism does not. But 
Rawls concedes that there is a sense in which the utilitarians are 
right that justice requires disinterest. At its most commonsensical 
level, justice is giving each his due, but men are notorious for over-
estimating their own due and undervaluing the due of others. 
Rawls somehow needs to combine the self-assertion of self-inter-
ested actors to guarantee one side of justice (the inviolable claims of 
the individual) with the disinterestedness required to satisfy the 
other side (the rightful claims of others). The contractual perform-
ance, to produce any agreement, much less a just one, must occur 
under a number of constraints. 
The antiutilitarian principle, the requirement of disinterested-
ness, and the demand of justice all can be satisfied by a process or 
performance which builds into the circumstances of the perform-
ance precisely those constraints implied by the foundational princi-
ples.'6 The performance requires unanimous agreement of self-
interested actors, deciding on what principles of justice shall guide 
their common life under the constraints on deliberation imposed by 
the veil of ignorance. Rawls makes clear the connection between 
the demand of justice and the constraints when he finds the source 
and character of the latter in a decision "to look for a conception of 
justice that nullifies the accidents of natural endowment and the 
contingencies of social circumstance (and psychological make-up) 
as counters in the quest for political and economic advantage." 
15. Jd. at 104. 
16. Jd. at 310-15. 
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Those "accidents" and "contingencies" are "nullified" in the origi-
nal position because the veil of ignorance guarantees that no con-
tractor can make any decisions taking account of any of these 
things. 
We have thus answered our first and second questions to-
gether: the antiutilitarian principle and the demand of justice com-
bine to produce the Rawlsian method of the constrainerl 
performance and the chief features of the constraints as well. It 
should be obvious, however, that neither the antiutilitarian princi-
ple nor the demand of justice can be justified by the performance. 
They ground it, and are not grounded by it. The presence of these 
more fundamental principles in Rawls's scheme does not qualify the 
character of this theory as one of constrained performance. Those 
prior principles are not themselves principles of justice, i.e., of right-
ful claims, but only disqualificatory of all claims hitherto put forth 
about justice. Being entirely negative, they generate nothing posi-
tive: the performance is to generate whatever positive content is 
possible. 
The third major question about Rawls's constrained perform-
ance remains to be considered: does the performance generate, as 
he claims, the two principles of justice? The veil of ignorance sub-
stantially simplifies the performance for Rawls. Since it makes all 
differences among the contractors irrelevant to what happens in the 
original position, Rawls need not consider a multiplicity of parties 
with a multiplicity of goals. The veil makes all men equal in the 
very strong sense of identical. Therefore, all reasoning can proceed 
with just one "representative man." Whatever principles he will 
select, will, by definition, achieve unanimous consent. 
He will accept whatever principle best satisfies the problem of 
rational choice he faces: how can he maximize his "pay-off'? Since 
Rawls understands rational choice in the manner of contemporary 
economics and c;lecision theory as the selection of the most effective 
and efficient means to pregiven ends, his veil of ignorance might 
seem to make rational choice impossible, since the chooser is denied 
any knowledge of his ends. Rawls circumvents this difficulty by 
stipulating that the ends toward which the choice is made are "pri-
mary goods," defined as "rights and liberties, opportunities and 
powers, income and wealth." The primary goods are not to commit 
Rawls, or his hypothetical decisionmaker, to any substantive con-
ception of the good or end of man as such. "Whatever one's system 
of ends, primary goods are necessary means." 11 Whether this claim 
17. /d.at93. 
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is true or not has been hotly debated in the literature. Is 
In any case, Rawls's representative man chooses rationally 
when he selects the principle that maximizes his holdings of pri-
mary goods. Again the veil makes that decision very difficult, or at 
least very abstract, for he knows nothing of his personal qualities, 
interests, position in society, or even what society he will be in. The 
most rational decision under these circumstances might seem to be 
to choose principles which will produce the society with the highest 
average quantity of primary goods. But to choose that way would 
be to choose utilitarianism, and not Rawls's democratic equality. 
This is the most common criticism of Rawls's reasoning about the 
selection of principles in the original position.I9 
Rawls maintains, however, that in the original position demo-
cratic equality would be selected over utilitarianism. While he casts 
his discussion· in the language of game theory, it seems to me that 
the strongest argument for his position is this: the representative 
man, selfish devil that he is, will not select a principle like average 
utility which contains no bar in principle against his good being 
sacrificed for the good of the others or of the whole. He will prefer 
the principle of democratic equality which guarantees that the 
others benefit only when he is benefited. Under democratic equal-
ity, he can't be thrown to the lions to amuse the crowd. 
As restated here, Rawls's argument is stronger, I think, than it 
is often taken to be, but it remains vulnerable to many of the objec-
tions that have been made to it. The representative man must face 
the fact that what he gains in security by choosing democratic 
equality, he may lose in opportunity.2o How should he weigh op-
portunity against security? As Rawls's critics have said, the answer 
must depend on attitude toward risk, toward maxima and minima, 
and ultimately toward lifestyles. But the veil of ignorance fore-
closes all such information in order to satisfy the demand of justice. 
Ironically, the demand of justice calls into being the particular kind 
of performance attempted in the original position, and guarantees 
that it must fail. 
Even conceding arguendo that the representative man could 
deduce something in the original position, it seems most unlikely 
that it would be democratic equality. Two other principles seem far 
18. See, e.g., D. ScHAEFER, supra note 9, at 37-38. 
19. Consider, e.g., Lyons, Nature and Soundness of the Contract and Coherence Argu-
ments, in READING RAWlS 160-67 (N. Daniels ed. 1975); Harsanyi, Can the Maximum Prin-
ciple Sene as a Basis for Morality?: A Critique of John Rawls's Theory, 69 AM. PoL Sci. 
REV. 594 (1975); B. ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 339; G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 
(trans. 1942). 
20. J. STERBA, THE DEMANDS OF JUSTICE 36 (1980). 
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more attractive. A position I will call "Pareto equality" (because of 
its similarity to the concept of Pareto optimality in welfare econom-
ics) would seem clearly preferable to democratic equality. Pareto 
equality would change only one feature of Rawls's democratic 
equality: rather than accepting only those inequalities that benefit 
the least advantaged, it would accept all inequalities that do not 
disadvantage the least advantaged, i.e., inequalities which make no-
body worse off but make some better off. Even a risk averse repre-
sentative man must see this principle as more attractive than 
democratic equality, since he cannot lose and he might gain from 
it.2' 
An even more attractive principle is what I call "welfare liberal 
equality." This is the model of justice that probably is most preva-
lent in America today. According to welfare liberal equality, justice 
requires "fair equality of opportunity" together with a "safety net" 
of social welfare beneath which individuals would not be allowed to 
fall. Wouldn't the representative man find this more attractive than 
Rawls's democratic equality, balancing better his security against 
his opportunity?22 
Rawls fails to consider seriously these two fairly obvious prin-
ciples. Most likely, he avoids them because they don't completely 
break the link between the undeserved advantages and the rewards 
of life. They thus fail to satisfy the demand of justice, even if they 
may satisfy the antiutilitarian principle; they may follow better 
from the rational choice of the original position than his own two 
principles, but they cohere less well with the foundational principles 
which motivate the whole performance, and which retain primacy 
within the theory as a whole. Thus criticisms of Rawls which focus 
on the derivation of the principles in the original position do not 
reach to the center of his theory. 
But Rawls's own democratic equality also fails to satisfy the 
demand of justice, albeit in a less obvious way than Pareto or wel-
fare liberal equality. Democratic equality, while not directly re-
warding the chance or arbitrary factors which the demand of justice 
requires be nullified, nonetheless preserves rather than nullifies ine-
qualities based on these undeserved inequalities. It allows inequali-
ties which benefit the least advantaged, that is, those inequalities 
21. Rawls seems to concede the force of this objection. J. RAwLS, supra note I, at 83. 
Cf. P. PEITIT, JUDGING JUSTICE 177 (1980); A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SociAL 
WELFARE 131-60 (1970). 
22. A lengthy defense of this point is in J. STERBA, supra note 20, at 38-57. He spends 
much space attempting to find a way to specify the minimum. L. THUROW, THE ZERo-SuM 
SociETY 155-214 (1980) also makes some relevant suggestions. Cf. M. BAYLES, PRINCIPLES 
OF LEGISLATION: THE UsES OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY (1978). 
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which are productive of more goods from which the least ad-
vantaged benefit by receiving some share. Rawls ties the differential 
reward to the differential social contribution, but what is it after all 
which allows the more favored to make their greater contribution? 
Surely it is the very natural endowment and effort which Rawls has 
thrown overboard as morally otiose prizes in the natural and social 
lottery. To reward the greater contributions is in fact to reward the 
undeserved bases of those contributions and thus to violate the de-
mand of justice. 
James Sterba argued recently that this objection "can be shown 
to rest upon a misinterpretation of Rawls' theory." He concedes 
that natural endowment and effort would "continue to be assets in 
the acquisition of social goods, but they will do so in a way that 
would be acceptable to persons who discounted their knowledge of 
their own particular natural and social assets, that is, persons using 
Rawls' decision procedure." The natural assets are not "nullified" 
altogether, but only partially so, in that while distribution in part 
continues to rest on them they can be chosen as the bases for distri-
bution by persons ignorant of their own relationship to those natu-
ral assets, and thus chosen disinterestedly.23 
Sterba's response, however, ignores the foundation of the 
Rawlsian theory. The demand of justice is more fundamental than 
the derivation in his original position, indeed it is determinative of 
most of the features of the original position. It is not to be sus-
pended on the basis of something derived in the original position. 
Moreover, Sterba believes that disinterestedness is the only interest 
the demand of justice is meant to serve. That surely is false; while 
disinterestedness is an important goal of the demand it is not the 
only one. The demand of justice requires more-it requires the nul-
lification of natural endowment and effort as the bases for distribu-
tion, not simply because people tend to favor themselves, but 
because these bases are, in Rawls's estimation, morally arbitrary. 
Sterba reifies the original position too much; it is, after all, merely a 
device for generating principles which must satisfy certain 
criteria.24 
Not only do Rawls's own principles of justice fail to satisfy his 
demand of justice, one cannot help but wonder if there are any prin-
ciples of justice which could satisfy it. I believe the answer is no, 
and invite the reader to attempt the experiment on any principle he 
or she likes. 
23. J. STERBA, supra note 20, at 98-99. 
24. Sterba's own modification of Rawls, along the lines of welfare liberal equality, fol-
lows also from the same misapprehension of the deep structure of Rawlsian theory. 
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The demand of justice, then, is the core difficulty of Rawls's 
theory. Why does Rawls insist on such a problematical principle? 
The answer, I suggest, is that he has misunderstood the very logic of 
desert. If justice is getting what one is due, then the basis of desert 
must ultimately be undeserved. Desert is a relational concept, ex-
pressing a relationship between a deserved and a basis of desert. It 
simply destroys the character of desert to demand, as Rawls does, 
that the basis of desert be itself deserved. For example, if we say a 
man deserves some primary good because of some quality or action 
"x," we can always ask, as Rawls does, "but does he deserve 'x'?" 
And so on. We then either have an infinite regress of bases of de-
sert, or we arrive at some basis, some beginning point, which the 
individual cannot claim to have deserved or to be responsible for, 
but only to have, to have been given. To demand, as Rawls does, 
that no just claim rest on an undeserved base simply means that we 
must cease speaking about justice, for on the basis of that demand 
there can never be any just claims-not even for equality. 
Rawls's analysis of justice dissolves the concept of desert and 
with it of justice. The great failing of Rawls's argument is that he 
provides no substantive basis for a claim of right or desert. Rawls 
looks to the constrained performance to supply this lack, but, as we 
have seen, it does not do so. The other constrained performance 
liberals, we shall see, can do no better. 
II. ROBERT NOZICK'S CONSTRAINED PERFORMANCE: 
THE FOUNDERING OF THE ANTI-
UTILITARIAN PRINCIPLE 
Robert Nozick seems to return to an older kind of liberalism 
with his doctrine of laissez faire libertarianism, but his theory also 
belongs in the Rawlsian tradition of constrained performance. 
However, the performance and the constraints imposed upon it are 
as different from Rawls's as are the substantive principles of justice 
Nozick derives. Instead of Rawls's antinature original position, 
Nozick returns to a doctrine of the state of nature much closer to 
that of Locke. Instead of the contractlike agreement of Rawls (and 
Locke), Nozick's performance leads to a state which is prohibited 
from engaging in redistribution for the sake of justice or from en-
forcing any pattern of justice at all. Nozick's is an even purer per-
formance theory than Rawls's because it has no standards of 
distributive justice other than the performance: the just distribution 
is whatever distribution the constrained performance produces, no 
matter what that might be, no matter how well or badly off the 
400 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 2:389 
members of society are under it. This radicalization of the perform-
ance is the most distinctive feature of Nozick's theory. 
However much he differs from Rawls on the character of the 
performance or its outcome, Nozick borrows his foundational prin-
ciple from Rawls. Ironically, his theory derives far more from 
Rawls, of whom he is a strenuous critic, than from Locke, whom he 
claims to follow.2s He grounds his theory on the Rawlsian anti-
utilitarian principle, renamed by him the Kantian principle. Nozick 
is led to modify the Rawlsian structure because he sees with great 
clarity that Rawls violates his own antiutilitarian principle. In sup-
porting the redistributive formula of democratic equality Rawls 
sanctions taking the product or property of some, the more ad-
vantaged, in order to benefit others, the less advantaged. Rawls 
even goes so far, under the sanction of the demand of justice, as to 
consider the natural endowments and efforts of individuals to be a 
"common asset" belonging not to the individuals themselves, but to 
the community as a whole. Nozick turns Rawls's first foundation, 
the antiutilitarian principle, against his second, the demand of jus-
tice, when he says, quoting Rawls against utilitarianism, that this 
common asset view "does not take seriously the distinction between 
persons." "[T]reat[ing] people's abilities and talents as resources 
for others" cannot be justified under the antiutilitarian principle.26 
Nozick's critique thus complements the one that I have offered. 
The principles of justice that Rawls derives from the conjunction of 
his two foundations can satisfy neither the antiutilitarian principle 
nor the demand of justice. 
Nozick thus perceives that the two foundational principles to-
gether lead to inconsistent results. One of them must go and 
Nozick has no difficulty deciding which one: he jettisons the de-
mand of justice as pernicious in its effects and neither intelligible 
nor defensible in itself.27 The differences between Nozick's con-
strained performance and Rawls's are largely traceable to the pres-
ence in Rawls and the absence in Nozick of the demand of justice. 
The first difference is obvious: with the demand for the nullification 
of particularity removed, Nozick can accommodate a state of na-
ture where men are allowed to act on the basis of their particular 
qualities, needs, and so forth. The demand of justice led to a con-
tradiction with the antiutilitarian principle in Rawls because it led 
him to attempt to generate principles of justice from the original 
position where the veil of ignorance covered over the particularity 
25. Cf R. NOZICK, supra note I, at 10-25, 228. See also id. at 183. 
26. /d. at 228. 
21. /d. at 213-31. 
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of persons. He then applied those principles, which might be ade-
quate for the sorts of abstractions who live in the original position, 
to real men who have particularity. This transference led to 
Rawls's violation of the anti utilitarian principle. Nozick avoids this 
trap. 
Another difference from Rawls is that Nozick builds his per-
formance around constraints that are more strongly responsive to 
the antiutilitarian principle. Rawls, it will be recalled, begins with a 
requirement that all must unanimously agree. This requirement is 
designed to protect the antiutilitarian principle. Nozick modifies 
this idea by insisting that the contractors must agree in their partic-
ularity because they are particulars, and it is only as such that they 
can (logically) be violated at all. The major constraint, then, which 
Nozick imposes on his performance is voluntariness or consent, not 
once for all in some performance that will produce something-
rules or whatever-that will then supersede the constrained per-
formance, but in the continuing necessity for the constrained per-
formance itself. 
Nozick most frequently refers to the constraints as rights; in 
terms of the classic Hohfeldian analysis of rights, Nozick's con-
straints are immunities rather than claim rights. To have a right, 
for Nozick, means to have a moral claim to be free from the coer-
cive interference of others. To have a right to life, for example, 
implies a duty on the part of others to forbear from interfering with 
the right-holder's life, but it implies no duties whatever to supply 
that person with the means to life. Any other interpretation of 
rights, Nozick insists, violates the antiutilitarian principle in that it 
gives some a claim against others without their consent, a kind of 
involuntary servitude.2s 
If immunity from coercion is the fundamental constraint on 
performance, then, since politics is inherently coercive, it would 
seem that no performance of a political sort is possible. Nozick 
thus begins with the problem of anarchism-not for any external or 
abstract reasons, but because the constraint he imposes to actualize 
the antiutilitarian principle would seem to make anarchy the only 
morally legitimate situation. Nozick is unwilling, moreover, to 
make foolish assumptions about human behavior, as some anar-
chists have done, to the effect that once anarchy is properly insti-
tuted men will cease being dangerous to each other. He sees the 
need for the state, but justification of it under his constraint is a 
difficult task. 
28. /d. at 130. 
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Nozick maintains that there is a performance that can legiti-
mately generate the state and a mode of operation for the state that 
can continue its legitimacy. He rejects the Lockean social contract: 
consent cannot be what legitimates a state, for no act of consent in 
the past can be more significant than present indisposition to con-
sent. Besides, unanimity of consent cannot realistically be posited 
for the denizens of actual societies. Nozick's performance is not a 
social contract but an "invisible hand" process whereby men pro-
duce a state through a series of morally permissible or even required 
steps, without aiming at a state at all, and whether they consent or 
not. 
Besides their moral immunity, men in the state of nature also 
possess a power Nozick follows Locke in calling the "executive 
power of the law of nature," which is rightful power to enforce their 
own and others' immunity. The use of coercion to protect against 
coercion is legitimate, but costly and time consuming. Nozick con-
ceives of various cooperative and other devices whereby men gener-
ate a division of labor with respect to enforcing the immunity 
constraint, culminating in a situation where an entity comes into 
existence possessing a monopoly of coercive authority, and offering 
protection to all within its geographic area, whether subscribers or 
not. Since the state's legitimate coercive power is constructed only 
from the individuals' "executive power of the law of nature," it can 
have no more legitimate authority than the individuals themselves 
had in the state of nature. It can be more effective than they, but it 
cannot have powers of a qualitatively different kind. Since the "ex-
ecutive power of the law of nature" is only immunity enforcing, the 
minimal state is the only legitimate state. If the state tries to estab-
lish any pattern of justice it necessarily will violate the immunity 
constraint, or rights. The performance which establishes distribu-
tive justice is the voluntary actions of individuals, free from all legal 
interference other than immunity enforcement. 
Does Nozick's performance successfully generate its alleged re-
sults? We may state our answer to this question as follows: if the 
state is valid at all, on Nozick's principles, then he has not suc-
ceeded in establishing the legitimacy of only the minimal or night 
watchman state, that is, of the state which may never redistribute 
wealth for the sake of satisfying the requirements of distributive jus-
tice. But Nozick also fails to establish the moral validity of any 
state whatever; his performance cannot get him out of the anarchic 
state of nature and into political society. The problem lies with 
Nozick's immunity constraint itself: it is too weak to establish the 
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theory of distributive justice he advocates, and too strong to estab-
lish even the minimal state. 
Nozick's famous "entitlement theory of justice" holds that the 
economic outcomes of actions taken in accord with the immunity 
constraint are the only possible just outcomes. Any other outcome 
requires an intervention which violates the constraint. But this po-
sition requires extending the immunity constraint from the person 
and action of the individual to parts of the external world which the 
individuals claim as their own, as their property. This extension 
proves impossible for Nozick to make successfully. 
He follows two rather different strategies in attempting to 
prove his entitlement theory. He first toys with a theory of "just 
acquisition," somewhat along the lines of Locke's labor theory in 
the Second Treatise. Nozick does not find Locke's account compel-
ling, and he fails to produce a satisfactory alternative. He identifies 
the center of Locke's doctrine as the view that "property rights in 
an unowned object [originate] through someone's mixing his labor 
with it." But Nozick himself wonders whether "mixing what I own 
[my labor] with what I don't own" isn't "a way of losing what I 
own rather than a way of gaining what I don't."29 As for a theory 
of acquisition of his own, he says "I shall not attempt that task 
here. "3o He does not attempt it, I believe, because none of his prin-
ciples has any room for it-neither the performance nor the con-
straint nor the foundation beneath both can generate the kind of 
relationship that constitutes private property. Nothing in the con-
straints would seem to require that the claims to ownership of prop-
erty be respected in the way that the immunity constraint imposes 
respect for person and liberty. Nozick attempts to get by with only 
the immunity constraint, grounded in the antiutilitarian principle, 
but to justify property he needs something more than these. 
Nozick seems to believe that even without a theory of acquisi-
tion he can show that all redistributive patterns of justice violate the 
immunity constraint and his Kantian principle. He asserts that re-
distribution in fact violates a liberty right above all: "Taxation of 
earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor .... [I]t is like 
forcing the person to work n hours for another's purpose. "31 Ac-
cording to Nozick, to take "five hours' wages in taxes," is to "force 
someone to work five hours." But this argument assumes that each 
person ought to own the full contractual product of his labor. The 
kind of contract one can make for one's labor depends, among other 
29. /d. at 174-75. 
30. /d. at 153. 
31. /d. at 169. 
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things, on the resources one brings into the contractual situation. 
These resources include wealth, ability, and so on. The legitimacy 
of claims to the full contractual product of one's labor therefore 
rests on the legitimacy of the relevant distribution of property and 
other sources of power. Without a way of declaring that one's 
property is as much and as rightly one's own, and thus as much 
guarded by the immunity constraint as one's person and liberty (la-
bor), Nozick's argument fails badly. In other words, the argument 
on taxation and forced labor begins by assuming its conclusion and 
is valid only under that assumption. 
But Nozick's difficulties go deeper than this. Not only his enti-
tlement theory of justice, but the state itself cannot be derived from 
his constrained performance theory. Or, to put it another way, the 
performance cannot satisfy the foundational antiutilitarian (Kant-
ian) principle, and is thus in contradiction with its own ground. 
The minimal state, he insists, derives its rightful, coercive powers 
from those that individuals possess in the state of nature, i.e., ac-
cording to the nature of morality. Nozick emphasizes that there 
can be no source for these coercive powers other than the preexist-
ing powers of individuals. He asserts with great confidence that the 
"principle that prohibits physical aggression . . . does not prohibit 
the use of force in defense against another party who is a threat."32 
But it is by no means so evident as Nozick asserts that the immu-
nity constraint allows the use of defensive force. Force against 
others is prohibited presumably because it violates their autonomy, 
their status as "ends in themselves." But defensive force, even 
against a violator of the law of nature, a violator of the immunity of 
others, is as much prohibited by this principle as offensive force. To 
punish an offender is to treat him as a means to my ends or the ends 
of the community in general. It is an effort to act against him in 
such a way as to make my rights and the rights of others more 
secure. Its effectiveness in deterring his greater threat against our 
rights is only a utilitarian argument in its favor. It does not satisfy 
the more stringent moral criterion that Nozick propounds. The 
only stance consistent with Nozick's moral principle seems to be 
"turn the other cheek." Without a rightful "executive power of the 
law of nature" the minimal state cannot be generated. Anarchism, 
pitched out with a hay fork, returns through the back door. 
The central difficulty for Nozick's performance lies in his im-
munity constraint. He derives that constraint in turn from his foun-
dational Kantian principle. Nozick asks: "[I]n virtue of precisely 
what characteristics of persons are there moral constraints on how 
32. /d. at 34. 
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they may treat each other or be treated"?33 He rejects as inade-
quate the usual list of qualities to which appeal is made to ground 
individual rights-rationality, free will, moral agency. While they 
may not individually suffice, Nozick thinks that 
[i]n conjunction . . . they add up to something whose significance is clear: a being 
able to formulate long-term plans for its life, able to consider and decide on the 
basis of abstract principles or considerations it formulates to itself and hence not 
merely the plaything of immediate stimuli, a being that limits its own behavior in 
accordance with some principles or picture it has of what an appropriate life is for 
itself and others. 34 
This adds up to more than the original three traits, and 
amounts to a larger "ability to regulate and guide its life in accord-
ance with some overall conception it chooses to accept. Such an 
overall conception, and knowing how we are doing in terms of it, is 
important to the kind of goals we formulate for ourselves and the 
kind of beings we are. "3s 
The moral significance of this capacity, (i.e., the claim that to 
exercise it is a right, to interfere with someone else's exercise of it is 
a wrong) lies in the fact that this is a "[person's] way of giving 
meaning to his life; only a being with the capacity to so shape his 
life can have or strive for meaningfullife."36 To be an end in one-
self, for Nozick, is to give oneself one's own "meaning of life." The 
content of what it is to be or be treated as an end is even more open 
than in Kant. Nozick's conception of the free, rational moral being 
is pregnant with no moral principles of a positive or substantive sort 
at all, only the immunity constraint. 
To be an end is to give one's own meaning to one's life. To be 
treated as an end is not to be prevented by others from so doing, i.e., 
not to be forcefully made part of someone else's "meaning of life." 
But why should the power to give one's own meaning to one's own 
life preclude sets of meanings which impinge on the meanings of 
others? What about the person, say a Marquis de Sade, who gives 
his life the meaning of using others wholly as means for his life 
plan? Indeed, who sets his life plan in that way precisely because 
the others are similar beings capable of setting life plans of their 
own. How much more satisfying it might be to such a person, how 
much more his meaning is projected into the world, if he forms a 
life plan which treats others merely as means. Why should the 
Marquis de Sade be limited, under Nozick's scheme, to recognizing 
33. /d. at 48. 
34. /d. at 49. 
35. /d. 
36. /d. at 50. 
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the rights of others? What might Nozick say to him? Of course, for 
the Marquis to claim the right to treat others as mere means does 
not mean they have a duty to accept his attempt, nor that he is 
immune from similar attempts on their part. The fact that others 
are, like himself, meaning-imposing beings does not of itself seem 
sufficient, for his effort to impose his meaning, even at their expense, 
does not deny that fact, but may depend on it for added relish. The 
fact that life lived in the manner of Marquis de Sade may be inse-
cure or even nasty, cruel, brutish and short, is a good reason for him 
to recognize rights or claims of others, at least under some condi-
tions, but it is not necessarily a reason to accept the immunity con-
straint as formulated by Nozick. 
Nozick thus fails to ground the chief constraint of immunity. 
One could say that the moral situation derivable from his argument 
is indistinguishable from a war of all against all, a war he cannot 
explicitly resolve in the Hobbesian or Lockean manner because of 
his strong immunity constraint. Nozick's constrained performance 
is caught hopelessly between two liberal traditions, between Locke 
and Kant. The core of Nozick's effort was to go as far as possible 
with the antiutilitarian principle alone. His foundering reveals the 
limits of that enterprise. 
III. ACKERMAN'S CONSTRAINED PERFORMANCE: 
THE FOUNDERING OF ALL PERFORMANCE 
Rawls tried to build a constrained performance theory on his 
twin foundations of the antiutilitarian principle and the demand of 
justice. His own adumbration of that type of theory revealed the 
untenability of the demand of justice; Nozick's effort revealed the 
untenability of the antiutilitarian principle. Bruce Ackerman at-
tempts to salvage the method of constrained performance by scrap-
ping both of Rawls's foundational principles. He tries to find a way 
to establish the performance and the constraints on it that will at 
once be less abstract and therefore produce more determinate re-
sults, and less substantive in the constraints it imposes a priori.37 
As he writes, he pursues "the old liberal dream of a philosopher's 
stone by which a commitment to a particular procedure of dispute 
resolution ... can be transformed into a commitment to particular 
substantive outcomes."Js 
Ackerman's performance is a dialogue, occurring any time a 
holder of power is challenged to justify it. "Whenever anybody 
37. B. ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 5, 49, 367-69. 
38. /d. at 12·15. 
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questions the legitimacy of another's power, the power holder must 
respond not by suppressing the questioner but by giving a reason 
that explains why he is more entitled to the resource than the ques-
tioner is."39 A successful defense is one which says something sen-
sible without violating a number of constraints Ackerman imposes 
on what may be said. The most important constraint he calls 
"Neutrality": 
No reason is a good reason if it requires the power holder to assert: 
(a) that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by any of his 
fellow citizens or 
(b) that, regardless of his conception of the good, he is intrinsically superior 
to one or more of his fellow citizens.40 
Ackerman applies his dialogic method with great boldness and 
some ingenuity to a wide range of difficult issues, including not only 
such standard ones as property rights but also areas like genetic 
engineering and liberal education. He proceeds in stages, first de-
veloping an "ideal theory," characterized by a number of unrealistic 
simplifying assumptions, and then a second-best theory, relaxing 
the simplifying assumptions. Ideal theory assumes a "liberal com-
mander," entirely dedicated to enforcing justice, and able to do so 
through possession of a perfect technology of justice. While Acker-
man professes great hostility to state of nature theory, he begins in a 
somewhat similar way. He assumes a group of humans deliberating 
over how to distribute holdings on a virgin planet, where all hold-
ings can be expressed in terms of a perfectly fungible item called 
manna. Under such conditions the only principle of initial distribu-
tion that can be justified, he concludes, is equality. Since no genera-
tion can claim priority over any other, all members of later 
generations have a right to holdings at least equal to those of mem-
bers of the first generation. From these general principles he derives 
principles of population policy and inheritance law. Ackerman's 
principles for governing economic relations are somewhere between 
Rawls's and Nozick's. He presses the issue of initial holdings much 
harder than Nozick does, and insists that each generation has a 
right to what the first generation had. But he does not require a just 
distribution of wealth at every instant. Free exchange is one of the 
liberal freedoms that, with qualifications, Ackerman defends. 
We must note, in passing, some troubling difficulties with Ack-
erman's formulation of an "ideal theory." How, in the real world, 
do we discover the baseline first generation and its baseline hold-
ings? Aside from that, we need to remember that the goods with 
39. /d. at 4. 
40. /d. at II. 
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which distributive justice is concerned are not pregiven, but come 
into existence through human labor. Labor, in turn, requires incen-
tives and the issue of justice cannot realistically be treated in isola-
tion from these facts. Moreover, Ackerman's approach to justice in 
holdings, while meant to be more humane than Nozick's, seems to 
lead to the same indifference in the face of need. The citizens of his 
state can claim the liberal education and the initial share of wealth 
to which they are entitled, but they have no right of any sort to 
welfare. Are we prepared to say that someone who even impro-
videntially squanders his or her initial stake and is without other 
recourse has no claim on the community for even minimal support? 
Ackerman's "second-best theory" attempts to adjust to the ab-
sence in the real world of either a perfect will or a perfect ability to 
achieve justice. In place of the commander, Ackerman develops the 
institutional mechanisms of liberal democracy. In a world where all 
liberal rights cannot be secured, Ackerman proposes the principle 
of equal sacrifice, providing that no citizen may be asked to sacrifice 
more of his or her ideal rights in the real world than other citizens. 
The liberal state is obliged to take various forms of affirmative ac-
tion to prevent or remedy such inequities as exist. 
With this brief sketch of Ackerman's theory behind us, we may 
pose to him the same set of questions we posed to our other two 
theorists. What kind of reasoning sustains Ackerman's turn to con-
strained performance theory? What reasoning supports the particu-
lar constraints Ackerman employs? And, finally, how adequate is 
the performance for generating the principles of justice he claims it 
produces? 
There is a certain obscurity in Ackerman's presentation of the 
grounds for the turn to performance, but the chief ground seems to 
be the very neutrality principle which becomes the leading con-
straint for his performance theory. Ackerman seems to believe that 
neutrality necessarily entails neutral dialogue, i.e., dialogue that re-
spects the neutrality constraint as the means of generating princi-
ples of justice. 41 But is it clear that neutrality implies dialogue, or 
that all dialogue is neutral dialogue? What about Socratic dialogue? 
Socrates sought knowledge of virtue, the good, and so forth, and 
never treated all "life plans" as a priori equally valid. Conversely, it 
is not clear why the neutrality principle especially requires dialogic 
application. If it can be established that the neutrality principle is 
true, or ought to be taken as the basis for political reasoning, then 
why not just say we will establish the principles of justice on the 
41. Jd. at 366-67. 
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basis of reasoning which respects the neutrality principle? Why all 
the talk about dialogue? 
There are at least three reasons, I think, for Ackerman's insis-
tence on the performance-dialogue character of his theory. The 
first, I suspect, is mere custom: ever since Rawls this type of per-
formance theory has been fashionable. More importantly, Acker-
man is driven to posit a dialogic theory because, he believes, he 
cannot establish in any other way the neutrality constraint itself. 
To establish neutrality in some nondialogical manner would be to 
violate the very terms of neutrality itself in that it would require a 
"claim of privileged access to the ultimate truth." To avoid this, he 
tries to show that a dialogue should lead people of diverse "ultimate 
truths" to agree on the neutrality principle. Ackerman's theory is 
dialogic then at the level of first principles in that it takes the inter-
locutors' own first principles as the foundation for establishing neu-
tral dialogue as the method of political philosophy. Even if 
successful at this level, however, that does not make the political 
philosophy itself necessarily dialogic. 
But Ackerman's most important reason for positing the per-
formance dialogue follows from the character of his foundational 
principle, which (like Rawls's demand of justice and Nozick's Kant-
ian principle) is entirely negative or disqualificatory. Can an en-
tirely disqualificatory principle produce anything substantive or 
positive? By itself, it cannot, and so the dialogue is meant, some-
how, to tum the comer. As we shall see, it cannot do so. 
How adequate is the performance for generating the principles 
proposed to follow from it? This question is more difficult to an-
swer for Ackerman than for the other two, because the performance 
is not compacted into a few grand moments, as in the derivation of 
the two principles in the original position, or the tracing of the gen-
esis of the minimal state. Ackerman's performances are many and 
varied, but nonetheless some core difficulties pervade the whole. 
An indeterminacy of result more vicious even than that which 
beset Rawls vitiates Ackerman's attempt to develop a performance 
theory. The central problem lies in an area to which we have al-
ready adverted: the neutrality principle, the foundation for the 
whole scheme, is entirely negative or disqualifactory. It tells what 
sort of principles cannot support just power relations, but neither it 
nor any other feature of Ackerman's theory supplies a basis for find-
ing principles which will qualify as legitimate. 
Ackerman recognizes that it is not enough for some claim to 
pass the entirely negative or disqualificatory neutrality constraint. 
So he offers some additional contraints: something must be said, 
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and that something must be self-consistent (intelligibility con-
straint), must possess "distinctive merit" (differentiation con-
straint), and must satisfy the conceivability constraint as well. 
To set them off from the disqualificatory neutrality constraint, 
we might call the other constraints "qualifying constraints." While 
they are necessary to his theory, they also stand in a certain tension 
with the overall thrust of his thought. In particular, the extremely 
problematical differentiation constraint requires that one have some 
notion of what makes one kind of reason more meritorious than 
another, and thus that one have some notion of a meritorious argu-
ment altogether. To the extent this argument is taken seriously, of 
course, the performance aspect of the theory as a whole is under-
mined, for not the performance as such but the meritorious argu-
ment as such would generate the rules of justice. The just claim 
would be the claim that had the most meritorious argument in its 
behalf, with meritoriousness established entirely prior to the dia-
logue performance. Thus the dialogue would be entirely irrelevant, 
and Ackerman would have a theory of the substantive sort he seeks 
to avoid. 
More importantly, Ackerman never specifies what counts as 
meritorious or relevant argument or claim; all that he does specify, 
again, is the disqualificatory neutrality constraint. Does that mean 
that any claim passing through the filter of neutrality will do? That 
certainly does not seem to be Ackerman's view; at one point he in-
sists, for example, that a claim to manna cannot be sustained on the 
basis of the assertion, admittedly non violative of neutrality, that the 
sky is blue.42 To satisfy the differentiation constraint, a claim must 
"conceivably count as a justification for a decision rule"; it must not 
be "totally irrelevant nonsense." But he supplies no basis in general 
for distinguishing relevant from irrelevant connections between rea-
sons and rules, and it appears that the neutrality constraint prohib-
its him from doing so. The relevance of a reason can be judged only 
in terms of some claim on whose behalf it is being pressed. But no 
claim is or can be simply neutral. To legitimate claims which rest 
on the lowest common denominator that all claims have in common 
is not to be neutral, for to reduce a claim to its lowest common 
denominator (i.e., to treat it in terms of what it shares with all other 
claims) is to prefer some claims to others. For example, to treat all 
claims equally and simply as claims is to favor certain claims of a 
"democratic" sort over other claims of an "aristocratic" sort. 
We may see this very general point at work in Ackerman's 
treatment of the theme of justice in initial holdings. The just rule of 
42. /d. at 40. 
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initial holdings, he claims, is equality; the basis for that conclusion 
is the fact that all human beings can equally claim to have a concep-
tion of the "good" and, according to the neutrality constraint, none 
of these conceptions may be treated as superior to any other. He 
describes the connection between having some conception of the 
good, and claims to equal shares of manna, as follows: 
While we may disagree about the meaning of a good life, each of us is prepared to 
say that our own image of self-fulfillment has some value. Otherwise, we should be 
willing to starve while the others took all the manna for themselves. And once we 
are prepared to affirm the value of fulfilling our own life plan, we may use this initial 
affirmation as the foundation of a public dialogue of right. Without attempting to 
evaluate the merits of our competing life plans, we may present ourselves to one 
another as persons who have undertaken to put a positive value on their conception 
of the good. Our claims to manna can be based on nothing more-and nothing 
less-than a dialogic exchange in which each of us describes himself as a morally 
autonomous person capable of putting a value on his life plan. Given this self-
description, it follows that something can be said on behalf of initial material 
equality.43 
He seems to believe something can be said, but he is not quite 
sure what it is. My best reconstruction is this: all affirm the value 
of their own conception of the good (however this might differ from 
saying all have a conception of the good); neutrality requires that 
they not grant higher value to their conception of the good, but 
must grant all equal value; therefore, all must get an equal share. 
What is missing, unfortunately, is what we need-a clear state-
ment of the nexus between having a conception of the good and 
having a right to any manna. Why is it any more or less relevant to 
move from having a life plan to having manna than from the sky's 
being blue to having manna? Some of what Ackerman says sug-
gests an unstated connection to the effect that material goods 
(manna) are necessary means to the effectuation of any and all con-
ceptions of the good, because after all people have to stay alive. 
Since Ackerman never states the reasoning explicitly or care-
fully, he never seems to notice that, even if we grant him the con-
nection he assumes, it does not follow that manna should be divided 
up equally, or divided up at all for that matter. Locke, for example, 
at one point suggests that a more rational rule is that all manna 
should remain in a common pool, with each using only as much as 
he or she immediately requires. Why should any more extensive 
claims to exclusive possession follow from the mere fact of having a 
conception of the good? Why should any right to achieve or pursue 
a conception of the good follow from merely having one? Or why 
not prefer Rawls's approach? To effectuate any conception of the 
43. /d. at 57. 
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good, an increase in one's manna is preferable to some fixed 
amount, and so it would seem rational to follow Rawls toward a 
rule that attempts to guarantee all more than they would otherwise 
have by abrogating the requirement of equal shares. While Acker-
man does not explicitly discuss Rawls's alternative rule, he does not 
follow him for reasons that are probably implicit in his great em-
phasis on the neutrality constraint: a rule favoring "more" does not 
equally or neutrally favor all conceptions of the good. It favors con-
ceptions of a more materialistic sort, and disfavors those who are, 
for example, more ascetic in taste, or who value equality over 
plenty. To be truly neutral over conceptions of the good forbids 
building in a bias toward more in the primary distribution rule. Of 
course, we must make the obvious observation that the equality rule 
can no more escape favoring some conceptions of the good over 
others than Rawls's democratic equality can. 
Moreover, is it true that all men grant the necessity of possess-
ing manna? If so, why? Surely not because of the mere existence of 
a conception of the good: there is, for example, no inherent or logi-
cal reason why a conception of the good as such must affirm life 
over death, existence over nonexistence. Ackerman's professed 
model, Socrates, himself points this up when he declares that his 
knowledge of his ignorance leads him to wonder whether death is 
not the greatest good.44 
Neutrality seems to require that the ends, or "conception of the 
good," be left entirely indeterminate, while the differentiation con-
straint requires some determinativeness whereby judgments of more 
or less adequacy and relevance may be made. Both constraints may 
not be pressed equally. If neutrality is given more weight, the result 
of the dialogue is perforce as indeterminate, or more so, than 
Rawls's deduction in the original position. If the qualifying con-
straints are pressed, then not only must Ackerman violate the deep 
rooting of the whole theory in neutrality, but he must give up the 
performance mode. 
For the most part, Ackerman tries to stay true to the insight 
expressed in the neutrality constraint. Another example shows how 
difficult he finds it to generate positive, determinate, and satisfac-
tory principles with that constraint. He applies his method of con-
strained performance to, among other things, questions of "birth 
rights." Are there duties to have children (no), a right to abortion 
(yes), a right to infanticide (no), a right to engage in genetic engi-
neering (no)? 
44. PLATO, The Apology of Socrates, in FOUR TEXTS ON SocRATES 11-36 (T. West 
trans. 1983). 
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His defense of abortion leans heavily on the performance side 
of his theory. Citizens are those who can raise for themselves dia-
logic questions with others. They and only they receive the protec-
tion the dialogic performance provides. Thus Ackerman rejects 
claims to rights on behalf of animals, trees, canyons, outer space, 
and fetuses. 45 
The simple truth is that a fetus is not a citizen of a liberal state. While it may 
possess a humanoid body, we have seen that citizenship is not a biological category. 
A liberal community does not ask what a creature looks like before admitting it to 
citizenship. Instead, it asks whether the creature can play a part in the dialogic and 
behavioral transactions that constitute a liberal polity. The fetus fails the dialogic 
test-more plainly than do grown-up dolphins.46 
The fetus itself has no dialogic rights on its own account, and 
any attempts to intervene to protect fetuses on any other grounds, 
for example, religion, run afoul of neutrality. Abortion is therefore 
just, or rather, given the structure of Ackerman's theory, interfer-
ence with abortion is unjust. 
Now, what of infanticide? As Ackerman says, an "infant is no 
more a citizen than a nine-month fetus."47 Yet he hesitates to draw 
the conclusion that seems to follow; instead he tries to find a "lib-
eral argument for denying citizens the right to kill their newborn 
children." He finds two such arguments. The first concerns rights 
of infertile parents who might wish to adopt a child. That argument 
has two great difficulties, however. First, it is relevant only under 
certain "second-best conditions," which are, by Ackerman's own 
hypothesis, irrelevant to the stage of the argument he is presenting 
at this point. Or, to put it otherwise, even if the second-best argu-
ment holds, he would seem to have to admit that in the ideal condi-
tions he hypothesizes, infanticide is perfectly acceptable, at least so 
far as the adoptive parents argument goes. 
The second failing of that argument is even more serious. 
Since infertile parents may have it as part of their life plan to rear 
children, the liberal state may not forbid them various means 
whereby they might attempt to fulfill their plans. For example, 
there must be a legal possibility for adoption, artificial insemination, 
test-tube babies, and so on; the state must not interfere with their 
right to procure a baby via some sort of transaction, just as the state 
may not deprive citizens of most other rights to transactions they 
desire. But as Ackerman insists in his treatment of transaction, 
one's right to engage in a transaction imposes no obligations on any 
45. B. ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 18. 
46. /d. at 127. 
47. /d. at 129. 
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other to engage in that transaction. 48 Furthermore, no citizen has a 
right to have his or her desire fulfilled.49 And every citizen has a 
right to dispose of, even to destroy, things which he possesses. 
"Neutral conversation legitimates acts of self-sacrifice no less than 
efforts at self-affirmation."so Putting all this together, what basis 
could adoptive parents of the liberal state have for forbidding par-
ents from pursuing a life of "self-sacrifice" -or would it be "self-
affirmation" -in the destruction of their infants? 
Ackerman has a second argument against infanticide. He de-
veloped earlier the legitimacy of a law against "wanton cruelty." 
"In the present case, the 'natural' parents have it within their power 
simply to pass the child on to another, yet they prefer to kill it in-
stead. What other reason can they give for their action but their 
desire to impose pain upon mute creation?" Now since they are 
obliged to "give reasons" only to proper dialogic partners, and since 
the infant is not such, their ability to answer the question would 
seem quite beside the point, as may be seen by trying the same argu-
ment out in relation to the ascetic who has the right to destroy his 
manna, no matter how many others are lined up eager to obtain it. 
In any case, there may be several answers the parents could 
give. They might have come to believe that life is horrible and want 
to save their child from much suffering. Or, they may just get their 
kicks this way-as part of their "conception of the good." Who can 
then say they are wrong, under the principles of neutrality? Yet 
Ackerman believes the liberal state may prohibit infanticide: 
[T]reating everything as if it were manna for citizen exploitation may be taken as an 
unsatisfactory expression of the liberal community's principled agnosticism about 
the "proper" relationship between the state and the larger universe. Thus, the citi-
zenry might choose to preserve the Grand Canyon or some other natural monu-
ment in its pristine condition as a mark of its collective uncertainty about the extent 
to which it may exploit the world for its own purposes; in the same spirit, it may 
restrain acts of wanton cruelty where the only reason a citizen has for abusing an 
animal is to see it suffer.51 
The "principled agnosticism" of which Ackerman speaks fol-
lows from the fact that "none among us can set himself up as a 
privileged spokesman for mute creation. . . . No political faction 
may declare that it has finally unlocked the ultimate mysteries of 
the universe."s2 
The whole notion of "principled agnosticism," when imposed 
48. ld. at 168-200. 
49. Id. at 45-53. 
50. Jd. at 61. 
51. Id. at 128. 
52. Jd. at 102. 
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on individuals, violates neutrality just as much as the imposition of 
any other religious or metaphysical belief. To be free to have one's 
own conception of the good means, Ackerman insists, to be free to 
be an atheist, a believing Catholic, a spiritualist, or whatever. 
Surely the way in which the liberal state expresses its principled 
agnosticism is by not imposing any views on or taking any actions 
motivated by such views against its citizens. That is, they must be 
left free to be atheistic, religious, materialist, or ascetic as they 
choose. 
Is it not obvious that this whole construction of a prohibition 
against infanticide, against destroying the Grand Canyon, in favor 
of "principled agnosticism" is just a patch, intended to shut out 
conclusions which follow from Ackerman's basic principle but 
which he hesitates for reasons of decency to endorse? The problem 
here seems to follow most especially from Ackerman's failure to 
specify what a person is, and what moral protection a person is enti-
tled to, and to what moral duty he or she is subject. Surely he fails 
to do so because of what has followed from every previous attempt 
to probe this issue: to discern what it is to be a person and on what 
basis persons deserve moral consideration is to point toward some 
substantive moral conclusions which overstep the bounds of the 
neutrality principle. Neutrality alone leaves him with an unaccept-
able position, which amounts to nothing other than that we may do 
whatever we like. Ackerman's performance is on the one hand as 
indeterminate in its results as Rawls's and on the other hand as 
prone to collapse into the war of all against all as Nozick's. 
Ackerman's theory is merely an updated version of a rather 
naive theory which had great vogue in some circles not so many 
years ago, and remains the standard undergraduate thought on the 
subject of democracy. This theory finds moral relativism supportive 
of democracy because if "all values are relative," or if all moral 
judgments are merely subjective preferences, and thus equal as pref-
erences, then the preferences of the majority should rule. Many ad-
herents of this view became convinced that challenges to the 
doctrine of moral relativism necessarily were also challenges to de-
mocracy.sJ These ardent democrats failed to notice, however, the 
simple logical error they were committing. If all "oughts" are 
equally merely subjective preferences, it by no means follows that 
the preferences of the majority ought to prevail. That conclusion is 
not somehow of a higher order and immune from the corrosive ef-
fects of its own major premise; it is itself merely one subjective pref-
53. For a lengthy discussion of the emergence and content of their theory within Amer-
ican political thought, see E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1980). 
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erence, with no more authority than any other. While Ackerman's 
position is not identical to this one it nonetheless has exactly the 
same difficulties. From simple relativism, one can only arrive at 
simple relativism. Dressing up your conclusions as the results of so-
called dialogues doesn't change this at all. As with Rawls and 
Nozick, then, what prevents Ackerman from developing a satisfac-
tory account of justice is the very foundational principle which 
gives rise to his entire theory, in his case, the neutrality principle. 
Why did he adopt that principle in the first place? He argues 
that a wide variety of routes, beginning at very different points, all 
lead to neutral dialogue. I will not even bother the reader with a 
reference to these many different paths, for he concedes, although 
somewhat indecisively, that they may just as well not lead to neutral 
dialogue. It is difficult to know how seriously one ought to take any 
of these arguments, since they depend heavily on caricatures of the 
opposition and wild jumps in logic to reach their conclusions. 
Ackerman seems to invest one of his arguments, the most far-
reaching and only potentially adequate one, with a certain priority. 
He calls it the argument from "liberal skepticism." Liberal skepti-
cism is the conviction that "[t]here is no moral meaning hidden in 
the bowels of the universe." This, says Ackerman, is the "hard 
truth."s4 
Yet [Ackerman says) there is no need to be overwhelmed by the void. We may 
create our own meanings, you and I; however transient or superficial, these are the 
only meanings we will ever know. And the first meaningful reality we must cre-
ate--one presupposed by all other acts of meaningful communication-is the idea 
that you and I are persons capable of giving meanings to the world. 
Yet this is just the achievement of a neutral conversation. . . . By speaking to 
one another in a Neutral way, we both succeed in giving our struggle a meaningful 
form. 55 
All this resembles nothing so much as Nozick's discussion of 
the grounding for his Kantian principle. Ackerman's neutral dia-
logue can no more grow from these roots, however, than did 
Nozick's foundational principle. One would be tempted to remon-
strate with Ackerman that neither dialogue nor neutrality follows 
logically, psychologically, or morally from this "hard truth," if he 
did not himself preempt the point by observing, echoing Nietzsche, 
that "[i]f God is dead, everything is permitted."s6 Beneath the per-
formance, beneath the constraints, lies nihilism. Ackerman, while 
philosophically not as adept or interesting as the other two, brings 
out with greater clarity than they do the fundamental character and 
54. B. ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 368. Cf id. at II, 365. 
55. Id. at 368. 
56. Id. at 369. 
1985] LIBERALISM AND NIHILISM 417 
significance of constrained performance liberalism. It is both an 
expression of and an attempt to overcome the unresolved problems 
of nihilism as proclaimed by Nietzsche. They prove once again, if it 
needed to be proved once again, nihil ex nihilo. 
Perhaps Ackerman brings the nihilism more into the open than 
the others, but it is equally there in, for example, Rawls's demand of 
justice, which dissolves moral claims of all sorts and overcomes the 
essentially moral commitment of his antiutilitarian principle. Nihil-
ism appears also in Nozick's conclusion that the only possible impli-
cation of the Kantian principle is the immunity constraint and not a 
positive or substantive conception of any sort of what it is to be a 
free, rational, self-determining being. As we have seen, Nozick can-
not even preserve the immunity constraint from the dissolving force 
of his conception of freedom. 
All three theories begin with a strong desire to preserve "the 
moral point of view" that there are standards of moral and political 
right, that each individual is a moral entity with moral duties to his 
fellows, and moral claims against them. But they ground or com-
bine this aspect of their theory with a conception of freedom so in-
determinate as never to be able to bear any particular content in 
itself. The content is thus to be supplied in the performance, but the 
performance cannot rise above the nihilistic notion of freedom that 
permeates it. 
Unable to supply any content via the performance, except per-
haps "do whatever you like," performance theory proves unable to 
keep hold of the moral point of view with which it begins. The 
question most forcefully posed by the failure of performance theory 
is this: is it possible to develop a moral position on the basis of the 
liberal principle, that is, on the basis of freedom? Performance the-
ory is instructive because it raises that very radical question. Per-
formance theory is disheartening because its failure suggests that 
the answer is "no." 
But performance theory is not necessarily the last word of a 
dying liberal tradition. Must liberalism grasp freedom in the nihil-
istic manner of the performance liberals? Nothing they say seems 
to establish any such necessity, but the challenge of overcoming ni-
hilism, of which their effort is a token, remains liberalism's most 
pressing task.57 
57. Relevant to this question of liberalism's ability to overcome nihilism are the works 
of Hegel on the one hand and Leo Strauss on the other. 
